99

TOP SECRET Action Control: 21089

Rec'd:

JULY 30, 1959 7:42 P.M.

FROM: **GENEVA** Info TO:

Secretary of State

CAHTO 183. JULY 30, 9 P.M. NO:

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS TALK WITH GROMYKO TODAY MADE CLEARER THAT THREE MAJOR UNRESOLVED POINTS WILL MAKE AGREEMENT VERY DIFFICULT. THE FIRST DEALS WITH THE CONTINUATION OF ALLIED RIGHTS IN BERLIN ON WHICH WE FEEL IT ESSENTIAL TO GET SOME LANGUAGE WHICH IN LIGHT OF PAST RUSSIAN STATEMENTS AND THREATS WILL GIVE US STRENGTH IN ANY RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS AFTER POSSIBLE MORATORIUM FOR FEW YEARS. THE SECOND IS THE SOVIET INCREASING INSISTENCE ON SOME REDUCTION IN TROOP LEVELS IN BERLIN WHICH TO THEM APPEARS TO BE ALMOST A SINE QUA NON IN ORDER TO SHOW: A) THAT THEY HAVE MADE TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN CHANGING STATUS QUO BERLIN; B) THIS BEGINNING OF LIQUIDATION OF OCCUPATION RIGHTS: C) SUCH A SHOCK TO MORALE BERLINERS AS TO BEGIN A PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERIORATION OF REAL IMPORTANCE. THE LINKAGE OF DIRECT ALL-GERMAN TALKS WITH THE TIME LIMIT TO BE PUT ON ANY TEMPORARY MORATORIUM AGREEMENT ON BERLIN.

WE CONSIDER THE FIRST POINT A PRACTICAL NECESSITY. COUVE AGREES BUT SELWYN VERY WOBBLY. ON SECOND POINT, ALL MY AD-VISERS HERE AS WELL AS AMBASSADOR BRUCE AND MILITARY, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER BERLIN, NORSTAD, AND PENTAGON. STRONGLY OPPOSED ANY REDUCTION BEYOND PRESENT LEVELS BUT WILLING TO PLACE CEILING AT THAT POINT. YON BRENTAND AND MAYOR WILLY BRANDT BITTERLY OPPOSED ANY REDUCTION NOT SO MUCH FOR MILITARY REASONS AS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS. I AM PERSONALLY

TERRIBLY RELUCTANT TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS THIS POINT. COUVE FEELS WE COULD GET AGREEMENT AT LEVEL SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 8.000 TO 10.000 AND WOULD FAVOR THIS IF IT WERE LAST STICKING POINT TOWARDS AGREEMENT. SELWYN TAKES SAME POSITION AS COUVE

10P SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED.

TOP SECRET

-2- CAHTO 183, JULY 30, 9 P.M. FROM GENEVA

INSISTENT THIS BE KEPT AS VERY FINAL CONCESSION. ON THIRD POINT, IMPOSSIBLE ACCEPT ALL-GERMAN COMMITTEE IN FORM PROPOSED BY SOVIETS SINCE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET WEST GERMAN CONCURRENCE AND HENCE PLEDGE BY US NO VALUE. ALL THREE OF US FEEL WE CANNOT GO BEYOND SUBSTITUTE FOUR-POWER COMMITTEE WITH GERMAN ADVISERS WHICH WE HAVE OFFERED AND BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD AS LAST RESORT ACCEPT THIS RATHER THAN NOTHING. ALSO FEEL SOVIETS LIKELY TO DROP LINKAGE IF THEY CAN GET CONCESSION ON POINT 2.


REMEMBERING FOSTER DULLES! OWN FEELING WHICH AS I RECALL YOU SHARED THAT TROOP NUMBERS IN BERLIN WERE NEGOTIABLE POINT, I WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR PERSONAL REACTION ON THIS AND THE OTHER TWO POINTS MENTIONED.

IT IS JUST POSSIBLE OF COURSE THAT WE COULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF RIGHTS ISSUE AND THAT TROOP LEVELS MIGHT NOT COME TO DECISION. HOWEVER, WE MUST BE PREPARED ON THIS POINT, SINCE IT MIGHT EVEN BECOME QUID PRO QUO FOR ACCEPTANCE WURDING ASSURING OUR RIGHTS.

FAITHFULLY, SIGNED: CHRIS."

HERTER

PJD-22



OECLASSIFIED

Authority

Authorit

GAN

FOR SECRET

July 31, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: EUR - Mr. Walworth Barbour

Subject: CAHTO 183

I have just seen the reference telegram and hope very much that the Department will endorse the viewpoint of the Secretary and his advisers at Geneva; that is, that we should not make any concessions on the question of the Western troop strength in

With regard to the penultimate paragraph of the reference telegram, I am aware that Mr. Dulles did express the view that the troop strength in Berlin was a negotiable point. However, that viewpoint was expressed some time ago, and my own guess is that bearing in mind the present circumstances, and his personal philosophy in these matters, that he would not now favor a concession of this kind.

William B. Macomber, Jr.